This paper investigates how firms responded to standardized nutrition labels on food products required by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA). Using a longitudinal quasi-experimental design, we test our predictions using two large-scale samples that span thirty product categories. Results indicate that the NLEA reduced brand nutritional quality relative to a control group of products not regulated by the NLEA. At the same time, among those regulated products, brand taste increased. While this reduction in nutrition represents an unintended consequence of regulation, there were a set of category, firm, and brand conditions under which the NLEA produced a positive effect on brand nutritional quality. We find that firms were more likely to improve brand nutrition when firm risk or firm power is low. Greater risk occurs when the firm is introducing a new brand rather than changing an existing brand and weaker power in a category is reflected by total market share in a category. Further, firms competing in low-health categories (e.g., potato chips) or small-portion categories (e.g., peanut butter) improved nutrition more than firms competing in high-health categories (e.g., bread) or large-portion categories (e.g., frozen dinner). Recommendations for firm strategy and the design of consumer information policy are examined in light of these surprising firm responses.
Introduction
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) sought to eliminate untruthful nutrition claims and to improve consumers' abilities to access and process nutrition information at the point of sale. It required manufacturers to provide a "Nutrition Facts" label displaying standardized information on all nutrients, recommended daily values, and an ingredient list on food products by May 1994 (Food Labeling Regulations 1993 . Health claims making dietdisease links or using terms such as "light" were also regulated for truthful content.
Before the act, nutrition labels were required only when manufacturers made an explicit nutrition claim in advertising or on the package (e.g., low sodium) or when the product was fortified with additional nutrients (Nutrition Labeling 1973) .
1 As a result, prior to the NLEA, most food products did not disclose nutrition information, making comparisons within and across categories difficult for consumers. Further, even those products providing nutrition information did not list recommended daily values for important nutrients such as fat, sodium, and cholesterol.
Theory suggests that the NLEA's required labels should promote consumer search and, in turn, stimulate competition to improve brand nutrition levels (e.g., Salop 1976; Stigler 1961) . As noted by the Federal Trade Commission (1979, p. 14) , "Information remedies have the direct benefit of improving the free flow of truthful commercial information. Informed consumer decisions then give sellers an economic incentive to improve the quality and selection of their marketplace offerings." This logic may be compelling, but, we still do not know if the NLEA improved nutrition quality. Studies focusing on select categories or nutrients generate mixed results (e.g., Balasubramanian and Cole 2002) . Further, no research has utilized a control group 1 The required nutrition information was serving size, number of servings per container, calories, carbohydrates, protein, and fat per serving as well as percentage recommended daily allowances for protein, Vitamins A and C, thiamine, riboflavin, niacin, calcium, and iron. In 1985, the rule was expanded to include sodium per serving.
to examine changes in brand nutrition. Such a control group requires a set of food products not regulated by the NLEA sold during the same time frame. Nearly two decades after the regulation, it is time for a comprehensive evaluation. Our first objective is to perform such an evaluation.
Our second objective is to examine the firm, category, and brand conditions under which firms did or did not improve nutritional quality following the NLEA. Past research leaves a number of key questions unanswered. First, prior research has shown that food firms with more power in a category were more likely to survive following the NLEA (Moorman, Du, and Mela 2005) . However, we do not know if these firms survived by improving nutrition levels or by improving taste. Second, we know that firms were more likely to improve some nutrients (e.g., vitamins) that would not affect taste in existing brands and reduce other nutrients (e.g., fat) that would affect taste in new brands (Moorman 1998). However, we do not know how the overall nutrition of new and existing brands changed. Third, previous studies generate mixed results across different product categories, and offer little insight into category differences that might explain these findings. Finally, these studies have not examined if an individual brand's preexisting nutrition level affected the firm's decision to increase nutrition following the NLEA.
Did firms further improve those brands already high on nutrition or those brands low on nutrition in an effort to capture a nutrition-sensitive segment?
To achieve these objectives, we offer hypotheses about the effect of the NLEA on brand nutritional improvements. We propose that since taste is more important than nutrition, and nutrition is perceived to be negatively correlated with taste, firms decided to decrease nutrition.
We then describe two large-scale quasi-experiments that investigate the impact of the NLEA on the nutritional quality of food products.
Did the NLEA Impact Brand
2 Nutritional Quality? Stigler (1961) proposed that when information is made available in the market, search costs decrease and search benefits increase which leads to an overall increase in the level of consumer search (see Lynch and Ariely 2000 for evidence of these effects). Search, in turn, stimulates firms to compete on disclosed attributes. Salop (1976) describes this dynamic between information, consumers, and firms as the market-perfecting role of information. There are examples where information disclosure has performed such an important role. For example, Jin and Leslie (2003) find that the introduction of hygiene quality grade cards displayed in restaurant windows improved restaurant hygiene. The case of nutrition information is more mixed (e.g., Viscusi 1994) . We examine this evidence while discussing the reasons why firms may choose not to compete on nutrition following the NLEA.
First, firms may choose not to compete on nutrition following the NLEA because they believe consumers value taste over nutrition in food. There is evidence to support this view (see Chandon and Wansink 2010 for a review). For example, a national survey of 2,976 adults found that, on a five-point scale (where 1 = not at all important and 5 = very important), consumers rated the importance of taste higher (overall mean = 4.68) than the importance of nutrition (overall mean = 3.85) 3 (Glanz et al. 1998) . Other research finds similar priorities (e.g., Borradaile
2007; French et al. 1999; Stewart, Blisard, and Jolliffe 2006) .
Food consumption trends point to the growing importance of taste over nutrition.
Between 1970 and 1999, per capita U.S. consumption increased 29% for food products with 2 We use the term "brand" to refer to individual branded products offered by firms in the marketplace. We ignore SKUs reflecting package size differences given nutrition occurs at the "per serving" level. However, "brand" does reflect offerings with flavor differences (e.g., Edy's Chocolate Ice Cream or DiGiorno Pepperoni Pizza) and nutrition differences (e.g., Jif creamy peanut butter and Jif reduced fat creamy peanut butter).
3 Glanz et al. (1998) does not examine the statistical differences between taste and nutrition. The article also does not report variance. Hence, it is not possible to provide more detailed tests to determine the value of different attributes.
added sugars and 32% for food products with added fats (see Putnam, Kantor, and Allshouse 2000) . Likewise, the average number of calories consumed in snacks increased 101% (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , compared to smaller calorie increases at breakfast (15.5%), lunch (20.5%), and dinner (-37.2%) (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro 2003) . Given snack foods generally have higher levels of sodium, sugar, and fat, which improve taste, higher snack consumption points to a preference for taste over nutrition.
Although not measuring consumers' priority for taste, field studies examining the effect of nutrition labels on product purchase indicate mixed response to nutrition information. Seymour et al. (2004) reviewed eleven studies examining the effect of nutrition information (in the form of point-of-sale displays, signs, and brochures) on the purchase of nutritious offerings in stores. Seven studies showed no increase, three studies found mixed results, and one study found a positive effect across categories. Balasubramanian and Cole (2002) find fewer purchases of vitamin-fortified juice, lower-calorie juices, and lower-calorie frozen dinners and entrees, but more purchases of lower-sodium soups, and lower-fat cheese and cookies following the NLEA.
This mixed evidence offers additional support that other attributes, such as taste, may be more important than nutrition.
Second, firms may anticipate that consumers will not select nutritious products because consumers think that nutrition is negatively correlated with taste. Sheeksha, Woolcott, and MacKinnon (1993) document that as consumers' perceptions of a taste-nutrition tradeoff increase, the reported value of performing health behaviors decrease. Raghunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer (2006) observe across four lab experiments that information about the healthiness of a food item reduces taste inferences. Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2009, p. 32) likewise find a negative effect on consumer choice for a low-fat option in a field experiment introducing shelf-labels for microwave popcorn; they conclude that "Consumer response to nutritional labeling may be influenced by consumers' taste perceptions." The reverse effect can happen as well. If a firm promotes the rich creamy taste of its ice cream, consumers are likely to assume that it is both better tasting and less nutritious. Generally, if managers anticipate that consumers will negatively associate taste and nutrition they will be less likely to improve brand nutrition in response to the NLEA and may instead decrease it.
Third, evidence indicates that consumers prioritize price over nutrition (Glanz et al. 1998 Kuchler and Stewart (2008) observe that between 1980 and 2006, the price index for fresh fruits and vegetables rose 49 percent while the same index rose only 6 percent for cakes, cupcakes, and cookies. 4 Given these priorities and tradeoffs, managers may not change or even reduce nutrition to keep prices low.
In summary, the research reviewed indicates that the case for the effect of the NLEA on brand nutritional quality improvements is mixed at best and negative at worst. Given this, we predict:
H1:
The NLEA had a negative effect on brand nutrition levels compared with control brands that are not required to have a nutrition label.
When Did the NLEA Improve Brand Nutritional Quality?
Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative effect for the NLEA on brand nutritional quality, in general. In this section, we examine the category, firm, and brand conditions under which the NLEA produced a positive effect on nutritional quality.
The Impact of Firm Power and Risk
We first consider whether new brands differ from existing brands in their response to the NLEA. For existing brands currently being sold in supermarkets, the risks of improving nutrition may be higher relative to offering a new brand which has no current customers and for which the firm has made no investments. Managers of existing brands may reason that it is not worthwhile to put current brands at risk given the nutrition-taste tradeoffs discussed earlier. examined had minimal effect on taste, this strategy allowed firms to respond to the NLEA without risking their current brands and customers. At the same time, new brands with lower levels of fat and cholesterol could attract new segments of customers. Although instructive, this study is limited because it includes only 124 brands. We predict:
H2:
The NLEA had a positive effect on brand nutrition for new brands compared to existing brands in the category.
A second firm factor we investigate is the brand's market share level. Following the logic above, firms should be more risk-averse with their large-share brands. In fact, because of their strong consumer following, large-share brands are less likely to benefit from and may even be harmed by increasing nutrition. Therefore, we expect firms to make fewer changes to the nutrition of their large-share brands, while being more likely to improve the nutrition of their small-share brands. Hence, we predict:
H3:
The NLEA had a positive effect on brand nutrition for brands with a smaller compared to a larger pre-existing market share in the category.
The third factor we consider is the firm's market share in the category, that is, the aggregate of the firm's individual brand shares in the category. Several viewpoints support the idea that a firm's market share in a category reflects a firm's power in that category. For example, the Department of Justice uses a firm's market share in a category to make an assessment of the anticompetitive potential of mergers and acquisitions. In addition, a metaanalysis of the relationship between market power and actions finds that firm market share is related to product quality and firm investments in advertising and sales force-key resources that can be used to respond to regulation (Szymanski, Bharadwaj, and Varadarajan 1993) .
We are not aware of any prior literature examining the impact of firm category market share on the firm's nutritional responses to the NLEA. Moorman, Du, and Mela (2005) observe that food firms with large category shares were more likely to survive the NLEA. However, they offer no evidence regarding whether these firms increased or decreased nutrition or taste in order to survive. We predict that firms with large category shares will be less likely to improve nutrition following the NLEA. A strong following of customers across offerings in the category means that these firms have the least to gain and the most to lose from such improvements.
Countering this prediction, powerful firms are more likely to have the resources and capabilities to make nutrition improvements. They have the ability to invest in nutrition, to test and re-label brands, to advertise nutrition improvements, and to manage the channel to ensure shelf-space.
However, we predict that given the risk, large-share firms do not act on these capabilities:
H4:
The NLEA had a positive effect on brand nutrition for brands whose parent firms have smaller compared with larger pre-existing market shares in the category.
The Impact of Category and Brand Nutritional Characteristics
We now consider how the nutritional characteristics of product categories and brands affect whether or not firms improved brand nutrition following the NLEA. The first is whether the category is a low-health category. Jacobson (1985, p. 85) used the colloquial term "junk food" to reflect low-health products that "have little or no nutritional value, or products with nutritional value but which also have ingredients considered unhealthy when regularly eaten, or those considered unhealthy to consume at all."
Before the NLEA, managers may have worried that improving nutrition for a generally unhealthy category might be completely missed by consumers. In support of this, Moorman (1996) found a negative relationship between product category healthiness and the level of nutrition information acquired by consumers. Furthermore, before the NLEA, consumers may have made more inferences about brand nutrition on the basis of category characteristics, for example, all cookies are unhealthy (Coupey 1994). However, following the NLEA, brand-level differences should be attended to more deeply and be perceived as more credible quality signals.
Given this, firms competing in a low-health category could see an opportunity to stand out among generally less healthy alternatives by improving nutrition. 5 Following this logic, we predict:
H5:
The NLEA had a positive effect on brand nutrition for brands in lower-health categories compared to brands in higher-health categories.
The second nutritional characteristic of product categories that will influence whether firms improve the nutritional quality of their brands is whether or not the brands are in a largeportion category, defined as a category whose offerings constitute the majority of a meal. For example, a large-portion category is frozen dinners and a small-portion category is peanut butter.
We predict that firms competing in large-portion categories are more likely to improve brand nutritional quality compared to firms competing in small-portion categories. Like brands from low-health categories, brands from large-portion categories may suffer from category-level inferences before the NLEA. For example, brands in large-portion categories may be viewed as less nutritious because they constitute the majority of calories eaten for a meal (e.g., the total amount of fat in a pizza is higher than the total amount of fat in salad dressing). However, following the NLEA, brand-level differences should play a bigger role in consumer decision making because the NLEA makes it possible for consumers to compare within and across categories. As a result, consumers are more likely to attend to brand-level nutrition improvements in large-portion over small-portion categories. We predict:
H6:
The NLEA had a positive effect on brand nutrition for brands in large-portion categories compared to brands in small-portion categories.
Finally, we expect that pre-existing brand nutrition level will influence whether a firm improves nutrition following the NLEA. The literature indicates mixed findings on this issue.
Mathios (2000) found that salad dressings highest in fat experienced the largest reductions in fat following the NLEA. In contrast, Moorman (1998) found no effect for brand healthiness on nutrition improvements following the NLEA.
We predict a negative effect of pre-existing nutrition on brand nutrition improvements for two reasons. First, if brands are already performing well on nutrition relative to other brands in the category, managers may conclude that there would be very little consumer impact of additional investments in nutrition. Second, managers may reason that if the brand is already high on nutrition, additional improvements may adversely affect taste or at least consumers' inferences about taste. For these reasons, we predict:
The NLEA had a positive effect on brand nutrition for brands with lower compared to higher pre-existing nutrition levels.
We test these predictions in two studies. The first study involves a multi-year sample of brands from Corine Netzer's Complete Book of Food Counts books which report nutrition for both brands required and not required to be labeled under the NLEA. The second study involves a multi-year sample of brands from Consumer Reports, which examines brand nutrition, taste, and price for select product categories. Both studies use a longitudinal quasi-experimental design with observations before and after the NLEA. We present the Netzer study first given its greater breadth of nutrients and scope of brands. We then present the Consumer Reports study which involves a subset of categories from Netzer but has the advantage of including measures of price and taste, which are relevant for the theoretical and policy implications of our results.
Netzer Study

Research Design
We examine the effect of the NLEA using a quasi-experimental design that examines brand nutritional quality before and after the new labels. A quasi-experimental design is used when investigators have control over the scheduling of data collection procedures without control over the scheduling of experimental stimuli (Campbell and Stanley 1963) . Our use of this design follows the tradition of quasi-experimental designs in marketing (e.g., Anderson et al. 2010; Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Mela 2010; Moorman 1998; Moorman, Du, and Mela 2005) .
Specifically, our design uses two periods before and one period after the NLEA. For explication, the early pre-NLEA time period is denoted pre1-NLEA, the second pre-NLEA time period is denoted pre2-NLEA, and the post-NLEA time period is denoted post-NLEA. Further, we observe a control group of food products for which the NLEA did not apply, giving us a multiple timeseries quasi-experimental control group design.
Sample
Our sample was drawn from three editions of Corinne T. 1997, data collected in 1996) . Even though the books do not contain all food products available in the market, they are considered a definitive source of nutritional information for food products sold in supermarkets and in some restaurants. Given this, we do not consider selection issues to be a problem. However, to be certain, we test for selection bias, as described in the next section. Over time, the number of products reviewed has increased reflecting brand proliferation. There were over 8,500 products listed in the 2 nd edition, 12,000 products listed in the 3 rd edition, and an estimated 13,750 products listed in the 4 th edition. These numbers compare reasonably to the number of individual food brands included in the IRI Marketing Factbook.
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In order to limit the sample to a manageable number of product categories, we select thirty product categories using two criteria:
6 Netzer does not state how many listings are in the 4 th edition. Based on the number of pages (770 pages), we use the listings per page in the 3 rd edition (12,000/672 pages or 17.85) to estimate listings in the 4 th edition. The number of individual food brands listed in the IRI Marketing Factbook is n = 8076 in 1990, n = 8490 in 1993, and n = 9036 in 1996.
1. Given we seek to replicate our findings across two data sets (Netzer and Consumer Reports), we include product categories that were also reviewed by Consumer Reports before and after the NLEA. This resulted in a set of twelve product categories: bread, cheese, hot dogs, ice cream, lasagna frozen dinner, margarine, peanut butter, potato chips, raisin bran cereal, soup, steak frozen dinner, and tomato sauce.
2. To provide a control group to examine change in brand nutrition, we select two groups of food products not regulated by the NLEA. The first group includes four categories of fresh products that are sold in supermarkets but are not required by the NLEA to be labeled. These are fresh meats (beef, chicken, and pork) and bulk nuts. Importantly, unlike many fresh fruits and vegetables, which also are not labeled, firms could improve nutrition in these categories. The nutritional quality of fresh meats can change depending on the way the meats are cut and the animals are raised (i.e., to have less fat) and the nutritional quality of nuts can change by the level of fat and sodium added during preparation. In selecting these categories for inclusion, we used several additional guidelines to ensure the comparability of the control group and labeled group. First, we stipulated that the restaurant products had to be listed separately in Netzer (e.g., a plain English muffin instead of an English muffin with butter). This was necessary because supermarket products are sold and listed in this fashion, which allows us to compare products across stores and restaurants. Second, we do not include fast-food products that are not sold in supermarkets because these products tend to have different characteristics. For example, we did not include cheeseburgers because there was no supermarket counterpart for sale during our observation period. Third, we required a sample size of at least five brands in the supermarket and in the fast-food restaurant to include a category.
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One concern about the use of restaurant foods as a control group arises because "eating out" evokes a unique set of taste-nutrition tradeoffs and so consumers may prefer taste over nutrition in these settings. However, if so, we believe that restaurant brands should be more likely to improve taste and not nutrition following the NLEA. Hence, if we are able to demonstrate that labeled brands decrease in nutrition relative to this control group of restaurant products, this strengthens our confidence in the test of H1. 8 A final concern about the control group is that consumers may be more focused on nutrition for the three control categories of fresh meats. As a result, firms may be more likely to improve nutrition in these categories. To resolve these concerns, we also test H1 by limiting the analysis to those categories with both labeled and unlabeled brands (i.e., removing fresh meats) as a robustness check.
With the exception of the fresh meats, which are classified by cuts and types, and bulk nuts, which are classified by type, Netzer lists all products at the individual brand level, not the SKU level. For example, for peanut butter, Jif Creamy and Jif Creamy Reduced Fat are listed separately, but Jif Creamy in different sizes is not. There are several reasons why this level of analysis is appropriate for examining changes in nutrition. First, given our measure of nutrition is at the "per serving" level, it is not influenced by package size differences that are often associated with SKUs and important to consumption (Wansink 2003) . Second, given separate brands reflect flavor or texture differences (e.g., chunky peanut butter or peanut butter and jelly spread) and for nutrition differences (e.g., reduced fat peanut butter), we are able to observe changes that might be obscured if a higher unit of analysis was used (i.e., only Jif was listed). Tables 1 and 2 summarize key features of the Netzer sample. We examine 2746 brands over the three periods from the 30 product categories we study: 1172 brands in pre-NLEA and 1574 brands in post-NLEA. We observe fewer brands before the NLEA because of a general 8 A counter view is that restaurant brands might have been influenced by NLEA to increase nutrition since restaurant owners perceived that customers were becoming more nutrition conscious. We think it is more likely that food manufacturers and restaurants both had a good understanding of consumers focus on taste and nutrition and that these did not vary. As discussed in the section on selection bias, although we match the product categories across the labeled and unlabeled groups, we cannot rule out all differences between the two in our analysis.
increase in the number of brands over the period and because some nutrition information is missing from Netzer for these periods (see section 4.4.1 for details). Given the natural entry of new brands and the exit of existing brands, not all brands are observed in all time periods resulting in an unbalanced panel. A total of 254 brands repeat in the data set from pre1-NLEA to post-NLEA, while 416 brands repeat from either pre-NLEA period to post-NLEA. Our estimation approach accounts for this data structure.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
Internal Validity Threats
Because quasi-experiments give up the control of the laboratory for external validity, extra care must be taken to rule out threats to internal validity (Cook and Campbell 1979) .
Although the use of a control group of unlabeled food products that was not regulated by the NLEA reduces these concerns, we discuss those reasonable threats and how each is ruled out through additional analyses.
Mortality Threat.
This bias occurs when the observed effect is not due to the intervention, but to certain types of brands exiting the sample. We view this shift in available brands as a part of the NLEA effect, not a threat to validity. Nevertheless, we investigate the issue of mortality by examining the change in nutrition for the subset of brands for which we have both pre-NLEA and post-NLEA data (see section 9.1 of the Appendix).
Selection Bias Threat.
This bias occurs when the observed effect is due to Netzer's selection of brands, which may not be representative of all brands in supermarkets at the time.
The ideal test would be to compare the nutritional quality of brands selected and not selected by
Netzer. This test is not possible because we are unable to locate nutrition information for brands not included in the Netzer books. However, we address this concern in four ways. First, we reiterate that the Netzer books are considered to be a definitive source of nutrition information.
Second, the Netzer books are sold to national markets and must contain a full range of brands available in order to succeed from a publishing perspective. Third, we compare the market share levels of the brands in the Netzer sample with a full sample of brands from the IRI Marketing Factbook. We find no market share differences between brands selected and not selected by Netzer (F(1,4843) = 0.028, ns). Finally, to test sample selection over time, we examine the average market share for the final sample of brands in each of the three years of the Netzer sample and find that, after accounting for product category, market share does not vary over time (M 1990 = 1.70, M 1993 = 1.42, and M 1996 = 1.50; t 1990 vs. 1993 (1401) = -1. 33, ns; t 1993 vs. 1996 (1401) =
. 49, ns; t 1990 vs. 1996 (1401) = -.98, ns). 9 Finally, the use of a control group reduces concerns with selection bias threat and history threat (discussed in the next section). However, given the products compared are not matched on every feature, concerns about selection, while attenuated, cannot be completely eliminated.
History Threat.
This threat refers to the situation in which the observed effect is due to another event, not the NLEA. One possibility is that some firms introduced new labels before the May 1994 deadline in order to gain an advantage. Moorman (1998) addresses this threat by counting the brands with the new nutrition label in January 1994 (five months prior to the NLEA) and finds that only 1% of all food products in stores had the new label. Another possibility is that firms changed the composition of their brands in response to the NLEA, but did not change their labels until May 1994. This seems unlikely because if a firm made early investments to improve brand nutrition, why would the firm not also attempt to gain a competitive advantage through early introduction of the label? Certainly firms invested in product development and marketing research in anticipation of the NLEA. However, evidence suggests that new brands were not introduced and current brands were not labeled until the NLEA deadline. We also include a variable for the time trend to rule out the possibility that the passage of time, not the NLEA, is responsible for our effects.
Measures
Brand Nutrition Measure.
Netzer reports fat, cholesterol, sodium, and fiber, but not vitamins or minerals. 10 We had two choices when forming our nutrition measure-form nutrient-specific measures (e.g., fat per serving) or form an overall measure of nutrition across nutrients. We use an overall nutrition measure for three reasons. First, nutrients vary in terms of how relevant they are for various product categories. For example, fiber is a key ingredient in bread, but not in margarine or cheese. Conversely, fat is a key ingredient in margarine and cheese, but not bread. Therefore, examining the effect of specific attributes limits our ability to make statements across categories. Second, although some consumers care about specific nutrients, for example diabetic patients care about added sugars and cardiac patients care about fat and cholesterol levels, most consumers seek a well-balanced diet with desirable levels of all nutrients. Finally, Consumer Reports data (see section 5.2) provides only one nutrient for each category (e.g., sodium for soup and fat for margarine) and this nutrient differs across categories (see Table 2 ). As a result, it is not possible to examine the same nutrients across all the categories. Thus, to keep relatively uniform procedures across the two studies, we use an overall measure of nutrition in the Netzer sample.
We create a measure of overall brand nutrition using fat, sodium, cholesterol, and fiber by taking the following steps. First, nutrient levels are reported on a per serving basis. Given serving sizes were standardized by the NLEA, we utilize the post-NLEA serving size to equate servings across years. Second, each of the four nutrients is converted to a percentage of Recommended Daily Value (% RDV), which was the standard established by the NLEA. 11 Three of the four nutrition variables (fat, cholesterol, and sodium) are attributes for which more is generally worse for one's health; fiber is the opposite-more is better. Given this and because we sought an overall nutrition measure that accounts for the four nutrients, we average the fiber %RDV with (100 -%RDV) for fat, cholesterol, and sodium to produce our nutrition measure.
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Given its construction, a higher number means more nutrition. We test the robustness of our results using an alternative overall measure of nutrition and individual nutrition measures in the Appendix. 
Moderating Variable Measures.
We test H2-H7 with two different models-one model involving lagged variables and another involving nonlagged variables. The lagged variable analysis tests H3, H4, and H7 which 11 We use 65 grams of fat, 2,400 milligrams of sodium, 300 milligrams of cholesterol, and 25 grams of fiber as standards (http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ConsumerInformation/ucm078889.htm#see6). 12 We do not include other macronutrients, such as protein or carbohydrates, in our brand nutrition measure because their effect on public health is less important and because it is unclear how to combine these indicators to form an overall measure of brand nutrition. We do not include a measure of calories given it is highly correlated with fat level ( = .80). 13 The Netzer books sometimes did not provide fiber, cholesterol, or sodium information during the pre-NLEA years. If an average nutrition score is formed for brands across the remaining nutrients, the measure will not be a valid comparison relative to brands for which all of the nutrient data are available. This is especially problematic since fiber is reverse-scored relative to the other three nutrients. We therefore restrict our sample to only those brands that had fat, sodium, cholesterol, and fiber information. One concern is that the brands with missing nutrition information from the pre-NLEA period may be systematically better or worse on nutrition than the brands with complete information. If so, eliminating these brands may bias our sample. To test for such bias, we compare the pre-NLEA brands with complete nutrition information to the pre-NLEA brands eliminated because they were missing one or more nutrients on the two nutrients which had more complete information-fat and sodium. We form a combined measure of fat and sodium by averaging the (100 -%RDV) of fat and sodium. Results, after accounting for product category, indicate that brands eliminated because they were missing fiber or cholesterol information are not different from brands containing all four nutrients that are retained in the sample (M eliminated = 84.60 vs. M retained = 84.50, t(2275) = -.19, ns). Another concern is that brands with missing nutrient information might have smaller market share compared to the brands containing all four nutrients. We compare those pre-NLEA brands eliminated and retained on brand market share and find no difference (M marketshare,eliminated = 1.49 vs. M marketshare,retained = 1.44, t(1187) = -.29, ns). The difference in degrees of freedom between the market share test and the nutrient test is due to the fact that a number of brands are also missing market share information.
focus on pre-existing levels of brand market share, firm market share, and brand nutrition. The moderator analysis variables are measured as follows.
Category predictors: We determined the low-health categories by asking two nutritionists to classify those categories that are low-health using the criteria described earlier. There was agreement that danish, French fries, hash browns, hot dogs, pancake syrup, pork sausage, and potato chips categories are low-health. We classify large-portion categories as those that constitute the majority of calories and nutrients for a meal; they are hot dogs, lasagna frozen dinners, steak frozen dinners, pizza, and pork sausage. Note that although fresh meats are large-portion, they are not included in this analysis because they did not require nutrition labels. Brand predictors: Lag brand market share is measured as the lagged brand market share for the same brand in the prior time period. As with firm market share, we normalize brand market share to the largest brand market share in the category. Lag brand nutrition is the measure of nutrition for the same brand in the prior time period.
Modeling and Estimation Approach
We test our predictions using three models. 14 Model 1 is a control group analysis of both labeled and unlabeled brands used to test H1. Model 2 examines the nonlagged moderators to 14 Field studies in marketing increasingly adopt a difference-in-differences modeling approach to rule out observed change due to unobserved levels and change in demand or supply characteristics. We do not feature this approach for three reasons. First, this approach requires survival over time. When observing customers, this requirement is important because mortality could change the composition of responding customers. However, given our interest in studying how firms responded to the NLEA and the very real possibility that firms may introduce or eliminate brands as part of that response, a sample that requires brands to be present over time would introduce a survival bias. Second, the number of brands that were in each of the three periods and for which we also had firm market share information drawn from The Marketing Factbook was 9% of the n=1984 labeled products. Limiting our analysis to these brands would reduce the external validity of our findings. Third, we have a control group which improves our confidence in the effects. As a safety check, we do include a differences-in-differences approach (see section 4.6.1) to test for the differential effect of labeled versus unlabeled brands (H1 which is the interaction of the NLEA and labeled variables. Given that an important alternative hypothesis is that the mere passage of time, and not the NLEA, accounts for changing nutrition levels, we include a linear time trend variable (x 3bt ). Finally, x 4 to x 32 are the set of fixed product category dummy variables; barbeque sauce is the omitted category. In this and the other models, all variables in the predicted interactions are mean-centered to improve interpretation. Meancentering allows us to examine the effect of the NLEA at the mean level of the other variables in our model.
In Model 1, the error term is e bt ~ N(0, σ bt 2 ) and we also include a random effect for brand, e b ~ N(0, σ b 2 ), to capture variance in nutrition as a result of specific brands. We are not explicitly interested in the set of brands selected, so treating the effect as random allows us to generalize beyond the sample analyzed. Within a category, each unique brand is identified across 15 The interaction effects tested in Model 2 were not estimated in Model 1 because of the manner in which we captured whether a brand was new or existing for the firm. Specifically, this variable was measured by searching for the brand in the prior year in the IRI Marketing Factbook. The set of unlabeled brands includes fresh items and items sold at fast-food restaurants, which are not included in the Marketing Factbook. As a result, it was not possible to examine the three-way interaction of NLEA*Labeled products*New brand.
time periods to enable the model to account for the covariance within brands. We use a mixed model estimated using maximum likelihood to account for the fixed and random effects. Models 1-3 are estimated in SAS 9.2. (3) where x 1bt is the NLEA variable that is 1 if the brand repeats in the data set in one of the pre-NLEA time periods and in the post-NLEA time period and 0 if the brand repeats in the data set in the two pre-NLEA time periods, x 2bt-1 is the lag value of brand market share, x 3bt-1 is the lag value of brand nutrition, and x 4bt-1 is the lag value of firm market share in the category. Our focus is on the interaction of the NLEA variable with lagged brand market share (x 1bt x 2bt-1 ), the interaction of the NLEA variable with lagged brand nutrition (x 1bt x 3bt-1 ), and the interaction of the NLEA variable and firm category market share (x 1bt x 4bt-1 ).
Given our other predictions, we include low-health category (x 5 ), large-portion (x 6 ), and their interactions with the NLEA variable (x 1bt x 5b and x 1bt x 6b , respectively) as covariates in the analysis. There is no new versus existing brand variable because all brands in Model 3 repeat.
Additionally, x 7 to x 20 are the product category dummy variables, the error term is e bt , and we also include a random effect for brand, e b . 17 No time trend variable is needed since it is perfectly correlated with the NLEA. We again use a mixed model estimated with maximum likelihood. Table 3 contains results for the control group analysis (n = 2,746). To increase understanding, we report the effect of the NLEA only in the first column and
Netzer Study Results
Control Group Results.
Model 1 results in the second column. Alone the NLEA has no effect across pooled labeled and unlabeled brands (β 1 = .123, t(819) = .73, ns). However, consistent with H1, the interaction of the NLEA and labeled brands is significant (β 3 = -.550, t(838) = -3.08, p < .01). The nutrition mean, as calculated from the raw data, increases from 59.15 before the NLEA to 64.02 after the NLEA for the unlabeled brands. In contrast, the nutrition mean for the labeled brands decreases from 70.09 before the NLEA to 68.38 after the NLEA. Given these results, we test for a significant difference in nutrition across time periods using Model 1. While the change in nutrition for the unlabeled brands is not significant (t(768) = 1.01, ns), nutrition for the labeled brands decreases significantly from pre-NLEA to post-NLEA (t(941) = 3.09, p < .01).
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[Insert Table 3 here]
To gain more insight, we examine brand nutrition for the labeled and unlabeled brands across the three time periods. The unlabeled brands decrease in nutrition from pre1-NLEA to pre2-NLEA (M pre1-NLEA = 60.08 to M pre2-NLEA = 58.19; t(757) = -3.66, p <.001) and then increase 17 There are only fourteen category dummy variables instead of 26 because nine of the labeled product categories (i.e., baked potato, danish, French fries, hash browns, lasagna frozen dinners, nuts, salad dressing, steak frozen dinners, and tartar sauce) are not represented in the lagged analysis and three product category dummies were omitted from the model to avoid perfect linear transformations with the low-health and large-portion covariates. 18 Examples of specific labeled brands with decreasing nutrition levels are Pappalo's 12" pizza and Progresso Minestrone soup. Pappalo's 12" pizza decreased in overall nutrition level from 54.60 to 46.90. On a per serving basis, fat increased from 24 grams to 32 grams, sodium increased from 1200 milligrams to 1420 milligrams and fiber decreased from 8 grams to 4 grams. Cholesterol decreased from 80 milligrams to 60 milligrams, however, this was not enough to overcome the negative movement on the other three nutrients. Progresso Minestrone soup decreased from an overall nutrition level of 71.94 to 69.04. Fat and cholesterol stayed the same at 2.5 grams and 0 milligrams, respectively, while sodium increased from 766.3 milligrams to 960.0 milligrams and fiber decreased from 5.9 grams to 5.0 grams. Although we do not use a difference-in-differences test as our primary modeling approach because of its limited sample size (see footnote 14), we use it to test Model 1 given its importance to this research. The dependent variable is the difference in nutrition between the post-NLEA and pre-NLEA nutrition levels for all brands in our sample that existed before and after the NLEA. The independent variable is the labeled variable, where 1=labeled and 0=unlabeled. Although we include product category dummy variables, the brand random effect and time trend variables are no longer relevant given the differencing approach. Results show a significant negative effect of labeled brands over unlabeled brands (β = -2.861, t(390) = -6.65, p < .0001), supporting H1.
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We also test the negative interaction between NLEA and labeled on nutrition restricted to those product categories with both labeled and unlabeled brands; specifically on the baked beans, baked potato, barbeque sauce, danish, English muffins, French fries, hash browns, ice cream, muffins, nuts, pancake syrup, pizza, salad dressing, sour cream, and tartar sauce categories. We replicate the significant negative interaction (β = -.663, t(585) = -2.65, p < .01).
We expected that the NLEA would influence both nutrition and taste decisions by the firm. Further, we argued that nutrition and taste influence one another. However, because our test of Model 1 with the Netzer data does not include taste, it may produce biased estimates. To resolve this endogeneity concern, we utilize an instrumental variable for the NLEA. As reported in the Appendix (point 1 of the robustness checks), our results replicate. Table 4 presents the results of the nonlagged moderator model estimation, which focuses on the labeled brands. Because we include brand market share and firm market share in the category as covariates in the model, the effective sample size is n = 1366 as some of the labeled brands are missing this information. Model 2 (Table 4 , column 2) tests our predictions regarding new brand (H2), low-health category (H5), and large-portion category (H6). Consistent with H2, the positive interaction effect of NLEA*new brand (β 3 = 3.027, t(527) = 3.58, p < .001) indicates that new brands increased in nutrition relative to existing brands after the NLEA. Supporting H5, the interaction of NLEA*low-health category is positive (β 5 = 1.981, t(368) = 4.50, p < .0001) and indicates that brands in low-health categories increased in nutrition relative to the brands in high-health categories after the NLEA. Contrary to our prediction in H6, the interaction of NLEA*largeportion category is negative (β 7 = -2.029, t(351) = -5.90, p < .0001), indicating that brands in large-portion categories decrease in nutrition relative to brands in small-portion categories. Table 5 presents the results for Model 3. This analysis compares brands that exist across the two pre-NLEA time periods (NLEA=0) to brands that exist in at least one pre-NLEA and the post-NLEA time period (NLEA=1). This sample involves n = 366 brands. Considering H3, we find a significant positive coefficient on the interaction of the NLEA variable and lag brand market share (β 6 = .207, t(115) = 2.37, p < .05). Given these results run counter to our prediction in H3, we examine the means derived from the regression model using a spotlight analysis (Aiken and West 1991). We observe no significant change in the movement of large-share brands but a small, yet significant, decrease in nutrition for the smallshare brands which explains the positive result.
Nonlagged Moderator Results.
Lagged Moderator Results.
[Insert Tables 4-5 here] H4 predicts a negative interaction between the NLEA and lag firm category market share.
In support of this prediction, the interaction is negative and significant (β 8 = -1.293, t(134) = -2.22, p < .05), indicating that firms with more power in a category were less likely to improve nutrition following the NLEA. Finally, turning to the effect of lag brand nutrition, results fail to support H7. We observe no interaction of the NLEA*lag brand nutrition (β 3 = .018, t(120) = .33, ns) indicating that pre-existing nutrition is not predictive of firm response to the NLEA.
Consumer Reports Study
Despite its considerable strengths, the Netzer books do not include taste or price information, both of which are important to consumer food choice. Consumer Reports provides nutrition, taste, and price in its evaluations of food categories. We use these data to examine the effect of the NLEA on brand nutrition while controlling for taste and price. 
Design and Sample
As with Netzer, we sought a sample that examined nutrition in two periods prior to the NLEA and in one period after its implementation. Nine categories meet our criteria (bread, cheese, ice cream, lasagna frozen dinner, margarine, peanut butter, steak frozen dinners, soup, and tomato sauce) and three other categories were evaluated once before and once after (hot dogs, potato chips, and raisin bran cereal) (see Table 1 ). 21 Consumer Reports evaluated different product categories in different time periods, so the year of data collection varies across the 20 Replicating all of our predictions from the Netzer sample is not possible for several reasons. First, Consumer Reports did not rate unlabeled products from our categories before and after the NLEA, making a full test of H1 impossible. Second, the IRI Marketing Factbook does not contain the store brands in Consumer Reports. Hence, these brands cannot be coded for new brand (H2) or brand market share (H3). 21 Frozen chicken dinners were also reviewed three times. However, widely varying descriptions and treatment of the category in the Netzer books led us to disqualify this category from both samples.
categories. For example, for cheese, the pre1-NLEA period is 1990, the pre2-NLEA period is 1993, and the post-NLEA period is 1996, while for margarine, the pre1-NLEA period is 1989, the pre2-NLEA period is 1994, and the post-NLEA period is 2000. Three categories are published in 1994 but before the May 1994 NLEA implementation date. We contacted Consumers Union, publisher of Consumer Reports, to determine publication lead time and found it takes an average of six months from data collection to publication. Therefore, we include these categories in the pre-NLEA sample. The time trend variable accounts for the varying time points.
The sample of products evaluated by Consumer Reports is very broad. It includes national brands (e.g., Prego tomato sauce) and store brands (e.g., Kroger margarine). Given that
Consumer Reports seeks to help a range of consumers and to remain objective, we believe the sample of selected products is not biased with respect to the health of the brands or their market shares. However, to mitigate concerns, we show that the types of brands selected do not vary across time. To do so, we compare the market share of brands from the Consumer Reports sample for which we have this value (i.e., national brands) to the category market share average as determined using the Netzer sample. In other words, we test whether the selected brands differ from the average brand market share across the pre-NLEA and post-NLEA time periods. This test shows no effect of the NLEA (β = -.420, t(114) = -1.15, ns).
The Consumer Reports sample consists of 910 brands (623 brands across the two pre-NLEA periods and 287 brands post-NLEA). Given the natural entry of new brands and the exit of existing brands, not all brands are observed in all time periods. Our analysis accounts for this unbalanced panel status.
Measures
Nutrition Measure. Consumers Union tests the nutritional quality of all evaluated
products in its own laboratory. In contrast to Netzer, Consumer Reports typically selects one nutrient in a category (e.g., sodium in soup or fat in margarine). 22 While limited, the attribute chosen is important to both taste and health. Hence, if competition were to occur on nutrition, this attribute would likely be the focus. We took the same steps to form our measure of nutrition in this data as with the Netzer sample; however, the measure was focused on the one nutrient. Table 1 reports the nutrient selected for each category. Average values are reported in Table 2 .
Price Measure. Price information is provided by
Consumer Reports in the form of price per serving. As with the nutrition measure, we utilize the post-NLEA serving size in equating across years. Prices were adjusted for inflation using the base year [1982] [1983] [1984] Consumer Price Index for Food and Beverages (see Table 2 for mean price by category).
Taste Measure.
Consumers Union performs sensory testing of food brands using multiple raters. Strict controls are used to ensure reliability. Consumers Union has developed "criteria for excellence" for each category. For example, an excellent chocolate-chip cookie should taste buttery. We compared the criteria for excellence used by Consumer Reports across each of the three time periods to ensure they were similar. Consumer Reports has generally used an interval 0-100 scale to report taste evaluations (see Table 2 for mean taste by category).
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22 Consumer Reports would sometimes evaluate more than one nutrient, but did not use this practice frequently enough to make comparisons across time possible. 23 In a subset of evaluations (hot dogs (2007) , ice cream (1986), lasagna dinners (1999), steak dinners (1999), soup (1987) , and tomato sauce (1985)), Consumer Reports only reports ratings on a five-point scale ranging from poor (1) to excellent (5). When this approach is used, it also rank orders the brands within each of these levels so that brands have both a numerical score from 1-5 and a rank within that score. In order to compare taste rankings over time, we converted these ordinal scores to the 100-point scale used in other years. Using the fact that Consumer Reports also reported the range for each score (e.g., 5 = 91-100), we classified the brands into one of five levels and we calculated the median interval value for each level. This median value was assigned to the middle-ranked brand in the ordinal data. Further, we calculated the distance from the median value to the minimum and maximum values within each ordinal level. Each of these distances was then divided by the number of brands below (and above) the
Model and Estimation
Recall that the Netzer data did not contain taste information and hence we had to resolve endogeneity due to an omitted variable bias. The Consumer Reports data contains information on both taste and price in addition to nutrition. Endogeneity is also a concern in this analysis because the firm is making nutrition, taste, and price decisions simultaneously; thus the NLEA is likely to impact taste and price as well. This results in correlation between nutrition and the error term. To resolve, we model the effect of the NLEA on nutrition utilizing a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) estimation with instrumental variables for taste and price. The following instruments are used for taste and price:
The instrumental variable for brand taste is the number of taste-related patents registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in a product category in the year the brand is observed. This measure therefore reflects new taste technology available in a category in a year. Of course, patents are protected and only the company registering the patent is able to commercialize related products. However, broadly speaking, the measure reflects taste knowledge among firms in a category in a given time period. To produce our counts, we searched for the term "taste" in the patent title that did not also contain "nutrition" in each product category in the USPTO database. For example, United States Patent 5,468,500 is focused on bringing a fruit flavor to ice cream products by inventing "a natural tasting soursop flavoring composition prepared by combining methyl butanoate, methyl 2-butenoate, butanoic acid, methyl hexanoate, methyl 2-hexenoate, hexanoic acid and linalool." This flavoring is used to improve taste, not nutrition. Unlike the effect of patents on high tech or pharmaceutical products, taste patents should not affect brand price either. This is the case because fast-moving consumer packaged goods products are more likely to recoup investments from scale or from first-mover advantages than from price markups, which are difficult in highly competitive supermarket settings.
The instrumental variable for brand price is the level of price deals in a product category in the year the brand is observed. Price deals reflect the average savings due to shelf price reductions or coupon redemptions. We collected this variable from the IRI Marketing Factbook from 1990 Factbook from , 1993 Factbook from , and 1996 to capture the pre1-NLEA, pre2-NLEA, and post-NLEA time periods, respectively. Price deals are unlikely to be related to nutrition or taste and instead are driven by brand or firm strategy, inventory levels, or competitor activities.
We used ivreg2 in Stata 11 to test Model 4:
middle brand. The score assigned to brands below (and above) the middle brand was determined by decrementing (or incrementing) the median score, and each successive score, by that distance. repeating brands is accounted for by the covariance matrix.
Consumer Reports Study Results
To assess the quality of the two instruments, we first note that their raw correlations are Specifically, the NLEA has a significant negative effect on brand nutrition (β 1 = -2.65, z = -2.49, p < .05). Average nutrition decreases from 83.12 in pre-NLEA to 80.47 in post-NLEA. 24 In terms of non-hypothesized results, we observe a positive relationship between nutrition and price (z = 2.80, p < .01) and a negative, but not significant, relationship between nutrition and taste (z = -.52, ns). We explore non-hypothesized results involving brand taste outcomes in the discussion.
Discussion
Policy Implications
There is little doubt that the NLEA increased the availability and truthfulness of nutrition information. However, our results indicate that the NLEA resulted in lower brand nutrition. This unintended consequence is an important reminder that effective policy should be designed to align consumer and firm responses. Our results identify two conditions that require different solutions to ensure this alignment.
In the first condition, policy regulates the disclosure of attribute information that is universally valued by consumers. In this condition, consumers search on the basis of the disclosure and firms have an economic incentive to improve the attribute's quality levels resulting in the market-perfecting benefit of information (Federal Trade Commission 1979; Salop 1976) . For example, the introduction of hygiene quality grade cards displayed in restaurant 24 Given the use of instruments and a two-stage model, we report means as derived from the regression model parameters as opposed to raw means directly calculated from the data for Models 4 and 5.
windows improved restaurant hygiene (Jin and Leslie 2003) . In this condition, information produces the desired alignment.
In the second condition, policy regulates information disclosure about an attribute that is less important to consumers than at least one other attribute. In the most challenging policy situation, the disclosed attribute is, or is perceived to be, negatively correlated with the more important attribute. In this condition, labels may not stimulate quality improvements on the disclosed attribute as firms focus on the more important attribute. We believe that this condition was present at the time of the NLEA-consumers valued taste over nutrition and believed that nutrition and taste were negatively correlated.
To test this idea, we examine the effect of the NLEA on taste with the Consumer Reports data using the 2SLS approach in Model 4. To do so, we used the same instrument for price and 25 The instrumental variable for brand nutrition is the number of nutrition-related references made about a food category during the year of observation in Factiva, a database that archives information published across media sources. To generate our measure, we searched for the terms "nutri*" and "health* together with each of the product category names in each year of observation. The * allows us to pick up all grammatical variations on these search terms. This instrument should be correlated with nutrition but not with taste or price. Results indicate that the joint test of the quality of nutrition and price instruments meets the highest threshold for the Stock-Yogo weak instrumental variable test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic = 9.49, Stock-Yogo critical value for two instruments = 7.03) as does the individual nutrition instrument (AP F (1,691) = 23.48; Stock-Yogo threshold for one instrument = 16.38). The price instrument is close to the highest threshold (AP F (1,691) = 15.34) and clears the next Stock-Yogo threshold (8.96) with ease. These tests reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The simple bivariate correlations between the instruments and the endogenous variables are also significant: brand nutrition and nutritionrelated references ( = .34, p < .0001) and brand price and price deal level ( = -.15, p < .0001).
Our results thus support the idea that well-meaning regulation generates unintended consequences when the disclosure concerns an attribute that is perceived to be negatively correlated with a more valued attribute. Additional strategies that account for the interrelatedness of the valued (taste) and the disclosed (nutrition) attributes are necessary to reduce the likelihood of these consequences. We now consider firm-and consumer-focused strategies that policy makers could use to reduce these problems.
Policy directed towards firms could involve educational programs at the time of the new labels that provide evidence about the nature and size of this market as well as the profitability of improving nutrition in new or existing products. Providing information on how to segment markets and market nutritious products would be very instructive to small firms that lack the resources to do large-scale research studies or to purchase syndicated research. Finally, regulators could publicize firm success stories on policy websites or create awards for firms that minimize the nutrition-taste tradeoff with new products or new technologies.
Considering other approaches, at one end of the spectrum, policy could help firms offer foods that are high on nutrition and taste at a reasonable cost by shifting the production possibility curve with policies that encourage R&D for new products and processes. Specifically, incentives could be offered to firms that introduce new products with higher nutrition levels, firms that perform R&D to develop healthier products which also taste good, or firms that build or purchase equipment to manufacture healthier products. These results dovetail with our finding that firms are more likely to improve nutrition in new products. Finally, on the other end of the spectrum, are excise taxes on foods that contain high levels of fat or sodium, similar to the gasguzzler tax for some automobiles.
There are also a number of promising consumer-focused policy strategies. First, policy should try to increase how much consumers' value nutrition. This long-term strategy would use public service campaigns that make people aware of the health benefits of nutrition and include school science curricula that offer consistent education about the importance of nutrition.
Second, given the perceived tradeoff between taste and nutrition, educational campaigns should challenge the assumption that "good nutrition = bad taste." Public service campaigns highlighting contexts in which nutrition is paired with good taste and sharing the results from taste tests on products with different nutrition levels with consumers are possible strategies. This contrasts with educational activities at the time of the NLEA which focused on the mechanics of reading the label (e.g., www.heathierus.gov/dietaryguidelines). Third, policy could seek to change consumer behavior by providing subsidies for nutritious food purchases. For example, food stamps could offer a 50% increase in value when they are used to buy high-fiber, low-fat, or low-sodium foods. Policy could also eliminate the use of food stamps for certain foods, such as New York State's attempt to ban the purchase of soft drinks with food stamps.
Firm Strategy Implications
We theorized that managers were nervous about making improvements to nutrition because they believed that consumers care more about taste than nutrition and that any improvements in nutrition might create a perceived taste tradeoff. This view is supported by our findings that firms were less likely to improve nutrition in existing brands or when the firm had more power in the category.
We realize there will always be firms that focus on taste over nutrition. However, we think there is more opportunity for firms to improve nutrition than they may have considered following the NLEA. Furthermore, given the public health crisis and the costs associated with the obesity epidemic in the U.S., we advise firms to give these options strategic consideration.
Given our results, we recommend five strategies for firms.
First, based on our results, firms should focus on increasing nutrition in new products and brand extensions. These products are particularly likely to succeed if they extend popular brands, such as low-sugar Edy's ice cream or low-fat Oreos. Importantly, this strategy limits the risk to the original brand while giving consumers healthier options. Second, in these new products, firms can replace fats with water, air, or other low-calorie fillers-all of which allow the product to retain its taste (and size) at fewer calories (Wansink and Huckabee 2005) . If these tastemaintaining, nutrition-enhancing R&D strategies are successful, this suggests a third strategy.
Specifically, firms introducing healthy new brand extensions should encourage consumers to do a taste test with the original product and the more nutritious introductions to challenge the belief that high-nutrition brands taste bad. Food manufacturers introducing healthy-line extensions could also issue coupons to shoppers who have recently purchased full-calorie versions of products to induce trial. Alternatively, healthy-line extensions could be priced low during introduction given that price is more important than nutrition to many consumers. As Wansink and Huckabee (2005) point out, replacing calories with water or air can also reduce ingredient costs that could be passed on to the consumer. If so, the result is a double win as such brands are not only more nutritious, but also cheaper.
A fourth strategy that increases nutrition without degrading taste is to introduce singleserving or smaller-serving packages which deliver the same taste but fewer calories (Wansink and Huckabee 2005) . Wansink (2006) reports the majority of consumers (57%) surveyed were willing to pay up to a 15% price premium for these portion-controlled packages. Therefore, although changes to packages can mean higher costs for firms, given the size and priceinsensitivity of this potential market, these costs would easily be recouped.
A fifth strategy for firms is to increase the value consumers place on nutrition.
Specifically, firms could feature the current "Nutrition Facts" label with front-of-packaging labels. Some retailers such as Kroger and Walmart have already begun requiring front-ofpackage labeling that post the most critical nutrition information (e.g., calories, trans-fat) or summarize the brand's overall nutrition with a numerical or verbal overall score (Martin and Brat 2010). For example, the NuVal system scores each brand between 0-100 depending on how well it performs relative to recommended daily values. The idea is that this simplification will increase consumer focus on nutrition at the point-of-sale. Food manufacturers may also find that publishing their own front-of-package label increases the emphasis on nutrition and simplifies nutrition information use. Product lines that have developed such systems since the NLEA was passed include Kraft's "Sensible Solution," PepsiCo's "Smart Spot," and General Mills' "Goodness Corner" which include either overall ratings or color-coding.
Consumer Welfare Implications
The story of the NLEA is not all negative. For consumers who found fewer brands with the nutrition they value, the availability of nutrition information made it easier to search for brands that met their needs. Further, the market is better for consumers who value taste, which improved following the NLEA. Most importantly, we observe nutrition improvements for brands in low-health categories. The general findings are consistent with Nowlis and Simonson (1996) who show that building on weak attributes has a greater impact on consumer welfare than building on strong attributes. Put differently, our results demonstrate diminishing marginal value from nutrition improvement, with the greatest consumer impact arising from a low base. From a public health perspective, raising the nutritional quality of the brands and categories with the lowest nutritional value will help consumers more than improving already healthy alternatives. It also will help poor consumers more given they are more likely to buy these categories and brands which are, on average, lower in price.
Finally, it is important to note that while average brand nutrition decreased following the NLEA, it is likely that some consumers shifted purchases toward more nutritious products, which would limit welfare losses. Future research could investigate this possibility with a more complete investigation of the market share changes associated with brands with varying nutrition levels over time.
Conclusion
As an information policy, the NLEA gave consumers the opportunity to search for and process nutrition information at the point of sale. We find that the NLEA also prompted an unintended set of firm responses, resulting in lower brand nutrition and improved brand taste.
These results occurred because nutrition is less important to consumers than taste while high nutrition signals poor taste. Our findings also indicate that among those food products regulated by the NLEA, nutrition improved among new brands, brands in low-health categories, and brands in small-portion categories. Future research is needed to uncover additional mechanisms that will help information disclosure policy align consumer and firm responses in positive ways.
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Aiken, L.S., S. To resolve this endogeneity concern from the omitted variable, we model the effect of the NLEA on nutrition utilizing a two-stage least squares regression estimation with an instrumental variable for the NLEA. We replicate our results using two different instrumental variables for the NLEA collected across our thirty categories.
First, we count the number of press mentions in a Factiva search for a set of terms related to the nutrition labels, specifically, nutrition label* or food label* or nutrition fact* or food fact* or nutrition education or nutrition information or fat label* or fat information or sodium label* or sodium information or fiber label* or fiber information or cholesterol label* or cholesterol information or health claim* or nutrition claim*, where * reflects all grammatical variations on the word (e.g., label* also captures labels). We expect the number of press mentions to increase following the implementation of the NLEA. Importantly, this instrument should be related to the NLEA but not to the omitted variable taste.
Second, we count the number of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Consent Decrees and Decisions. The FTC issues decrees and decisions in response to alleged violations of federal law prohibiting unfair acts, practices, and methods of competition. The decisions include "cease and desist" orders that forbid companies from engaging in certain practices. For example, in June 1991, the FTC brought a suit against Campbell's for advertising that their soup reduces the risk of heart disease. In this case the soup had a high sodium content which is a disease risk for cardiovascular patients. Recall that the NLEA established a set of legal guidelines for the nutritional labeling of products, as well as for using health claims (e.g., "low in sodium") and diet-disease claims (e.g., "low fat reduces heart disease"). Given this, in the presence of the NLEA, there should be more decisions by the FTC adjudicating on nutrition label cases. Before the NLEA, fewer cases would be brought because the laws were weaker. Our instrument is therefore the number of FTC Consent Decrees and Decisions focused on nutrition. We used the same set of nutrition label search terms used in the Factiva search across all 30 categories. The number of such FTC actions should be related to the NLEA but not to the omitted variable taste.
Recall that we observe the nutrition of brands in 1990 (pre1-NLEA), 1993 (pre2-NLEA), and 1996 (post-NLEA). To avoid proximity to the NLEA (passed in 1994), we used instrumental variable counts lagged one year before the brand nutrition observation. Therefore, each instrumental variable was collected in 1989 (pre1-NLEA), 1992 (pre-NLEA2), and 1995 (post-NLEA). We used ivreg2 in Stata 11 to test Model 1 as a two-stage least squares analysis. We find similar results using either instrument, so we report only the Factiva search results here. We assess the quality of instrumental variable using the Angrist-Pishke (AP) F-test and critical values established by Stock and Yogo (2005) . Results reject the null hypothesis of a weak instrument. Specifically, the AP F (1, 2004) = 2784.57 meets the highest threshold for the StockYogo test of one instrument (threshold = 16.38). The simple bivariate correlations between the instrument and the endogenous variable is also significant (NLEA and nutrition-information references, = .65, p < .0001).The overall fit of the model in the second stage is significant (F (33,2004) = 147.63, p < .00001) (Wooldridge 2006) . We replicate the NLEA*labeled products interaction predicted in H1 (β 3 = -.93, z = -2.21, p < .03). We also replicate our results using the Factiva measure lagged two years before the brand nutrition observation.
2. Alternative overall nutrition measure. In addition to the overall brand nutrition measure used in our models, we re-estimate our models using a measure of weighted brand nutrition. This measure weights each of the nutrients by the mean level of that nutrient in the product category. This means that the nutrition level is more heavily weighted by the most important nutrient for that category. For example, fat is given a greater weight in the nutrition measure for ice cream while sodium is given a greater weight for soup. All results replicate except for the lagged firm category market share result, which has the same directional effect but is not significant.
3. Nutrient-specific measures. H1 results for nutrients are provided in footnote 19. For the nonlagged moderator analysis (H2, H5, and H6), all three predicted interactions replicate for fat and sodium; large-portion category replicates for cholesterol; and low-health category and largeportion category replicate for fiber. For the lagged moderator analysis, the brand market share interaction (H3) and the firm category market share interaction (H4) replicate for cholesterol and fiber only. We do not consider H7 given it was not significant in the main lagged moderator analysis. Across the five predictions and four nutrients in the moderator analysis, we replicate 15 of the potential 20 findings.
Year-specific dummy variables.
We re-analyze the control group model (Model 1) using a set of dummy variables for the three time periods rather than using only one dummy variable to capture the pre-NLEA versus post-NLEA periods. We create two dummy variables to denote brands from 1990 and brands from 1996; thus the 1993 brands serve as the baseline. Both dummy variables are interacted with the labeled versus unlabeled brand variable and both are significant (see details in section 4.6.1).
5. Importance of specific product categories. To test the stability of our results, we use a variant of a jackknife analysis (Ang 1998). Specifically, we re-estimate Model 1 thirty times, each time deleting the brands from a specific product category. A jackknife pseudo-value is calculated, which captures the bias between the beta estimated from the model on the full data set and the beta estimated from the data set deleting out the brands from a specific product category (J = k + (k-1) *, where k is the number of product categories). A 95% confidence interval is created around the mean pseudo-value. We check that the estimated beta from the full data set is within that confidence interval and find that it was for the NLEA*labeled interaction from Model 1. A similar analysis for Models 2 and 3 indicates that the betas associated with the predicted interaction effects also fall within the respective confidence intervals.
6. Mortality threat. To examine the mortality threat, we re-estimate Model 1 and Model 2 on those brands that repeat in the data for at least one pre-NLEA period and the post-NLEA period and replicate our results. We do not examine this threat for Model 3 because it is already tested on brands that survive over time. Notes: Both models include a random effect for brand. Standard errors are in parentheses. There are only fourteen category dummy variables instead of 26 because nine of the labeled product categories (i.e., baked potato, danish, French fries, hash browns, lasagna frozen dinners, nuts, salad dressing, steak frozen dinners, and tartar sauce) are not represented in the lagged sample and three product category dummies were omitted from the model to avoid perfect linear transformations with the low-health and large-portion covariates. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, + p < 0.10
